

2025

Remuneration Report

Remuneration Report 2025

Remuneration of the members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board

The following remuneration report in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) presents and explains the remuneration granted and owed in the 2025 financial year to the current and former members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board of SUSS MicroTec SE (hereinafter also referred to as “SUSS” or the “Company”). The Remuneration Report provides a detailed and individualized explanation of the structure and amount of the individual components of the remuneration of the Management Board and Supervisory Board. The Remuneration Report was prepared jointly by the Management Board and the Supervisory Board.

Remuneration of Management Board members Review of the 2025 remuneration year

The Management Board of SUSS MicroTec SE considers the development of the Group in the financial year as a whole to be still satisfactory. Compared to the previous year, sales increased by 12.6% to €503.2 million (previous year: €446.7 million). Profitability, on the other hand, fell short of expectations. The consolidated net income of the SUSS Group amounted to €46.1 million for the 2025 financial year (previous year: €110.0 million). Overall, and taking into account the net income of SUSS MicroTec SE, the Management Board therefore considers the performance of SUSS in the financial year to be satisfactory.

With regard to achieving the STI 2025 targets, the revenue target was slightly exceeded. However, the threshold for achieving the target for net income was not met. The sustainability target for 2025 was significantly exceeded, and the innovation and market position target was fully achieved. This results in an STI target achievement rate of 77 percent for the fiscal year 2025. The target achievement for the 2023–2025 LTI tranche was 174 percent, as all performance criteria (Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), revenue growth, relative TSR, sustainability target) in the three-year performance period exceeded 100 percent of the target value.

In fiscal year 2025, changes were made to accounting policies during the preparation of the consolidated financial statements, which also resulted in retroactive adjustments to the prior-year comparative figures (2024 restatement). To ensure that these purely methodological effects do not result in either advantages or disadvantages regarding variable compensation (no windfall profits/no windfall losses), the Supervisory Board has technically adjusted the financial targets (revenue/net income) relevant for the calculation of the STI 2025, as well as the targets of the affected financial performance criterion ROCE for the LTI tranches, in the sense of a “what-if” adjustment. Detailed information on the accounting changes is disclosed in the Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements in Chapter D) “Effects of Retrospective Adjustments or Corrections and Retrospective Changes in Accordance with IAS 8.”

Vote on the 2024 remuneration report at the 2025 Annual General Meeting

The 2025 Annual General Meeting approved the remuneration report for the 2024 financial year with a majority of 89.6% of the votes cast. Subsequently, the Supervisory Board dealt with the feedback received from shareholders and proxy advisors as part of the consultative vote. In view of the high approval rate and the overall positive feedback, the Supervisory Board currently sees no reason for fundamental adjustments to the remuneration reporting.

Revised remuneration system for Management Board members effective from the 2026 financial year

The current remuneration system ("2022 Remuneration System") for the members of the Management Board of SUSS MicroTec SE was approved by the Annual General Meeting on May 31, 2022 with a majority of 98.4% of the votes cast, so that a new resolution on the Management Board remuneration system is required at the Annual General Meeting as scheduled. Against this backdrop, the Supervisory Board reviewed the current remuneration system with regard to its market conformity and competitiveness, taking into account the Company's strategic objectives and feedback from shareholders and proxy advisors in particular. Based on the results of the review, the 2022 Remuneration System was further developed in individual areas. The Supervisory Board of the Company approved the revised remuneration system for the members of the Management Board ("2026 Remuneration System") at its meetings on December 7, 2025 and March 23, 2026, following preparation and consultation with its Personnel and Nomination Committee. The 2026 Remuneration System will be submitted to the 2026 Annual General Meeting for approval and is to apply retroactively to all Management Board members from January 1, 2026. The main changes compared to the current 2022 Remuneration System are summarized at the end of this remuneration report in the section "Outlook for the 2026 financial year from a remuneration perspective".

Overview of the composition of the Management Board in the 2025 financial year

Current Management Board members

- Burkhardt Frick, Member and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Management Board (since September 11, 2023)
- Dr. Cornelia Ballwieser, Member of the Management Board and CFO (since July 1, 2023)
- Dr. Thomas Rohe, Member of the Management Board and COO (since May 1, 2021)

There were no changes to the Management Board of SUSS MicroTec SE in the past financial year.

Management Board remuneration systems applicable in the 2025 financial year

2022 Remuneration System – applicable to all current Management Board members

For the 2025 financial year, only the 2022 Remuneration System, which was approved by the Annual General Meeting on May 31, 2022, with a majority of 98.4% of the votes cast, was applied to the remuneration of all current members of the Management Board of SUSS MicroTec SE. The 2022 Remuneration System applies to the employment contracts of all current members of the Management Board (Burkhardt Frick (CEO), Dr. Cornelia Ballwieser (CFO) and Dr. Thomas Rohe (COO)). A complete

description of the 2022 Remuneration System is available on the Company's website at www.suss.com/en/investor-relations/corporate-governance.

2021 Remuneration System – application only for former Management Board member Oliver Albrecht with regard to the LTI 2023–2025 allocated under his former contract

The previous remuneration system approved by the Annual General Meeting on June 16, 2021 ("2021 Remuneration System") only applied in the past financial year to the outstanding LTI tranche 2023–2025 of former Management Board member Oliver Albrecht, who left the Management Board in the 2023 financial year on April 30, 2023, when his term of office expired and has now been fully vested as of the 2025 reporting year. A complete description of the 2021 Remuneration System is available on the Company's website at www.suss.com/en/investor-relations/corporate-governance.

Main features of the 2022 Remuneration System

The Supervisory Board is guided by the following principles when structuring the remuneration system and determining the specific remuneration of the Management Board:

Strategic orientation

The Management Board remuneration system as a whole makes a significant contribution to promoting and implementing SUSS's corporate strategy. This is ensured by defining performance criteria related to the long-term and sustainable success of the Company and linking them with ambitious annual and multi-year targets. The short-term variable remuneration is primarily based on the financial performance criteria of sales and net income for the financial year. The long-term variable remuneration is based, among other things, on the financial performance criteria of sales growth and return on capital employed (ROCE). This promotes the focus on organic growth, profitability, and return on investment in the Management Board's activities.

Performance orientation

The remuneration system is designed in such a way that it provides ambitious and appropriate performance incentives for the members of the Management Board. The variable, performance-based remuneration components represent a significant proportion of the total remuneration if 100% of the targets are achieved. The individual remuneration of each Management Board member is therefore proportionate to their duties and performance as well as to the situation of the Company.

Long-term orientation and sustainability

A key aspect of SUSS's corporate strategy is the Company's long-term and sustainable development. To align remuneration with SUSS's long-term development, the long-term variable remuneration constitutes a significant portion of the total remuneration and exceeds the short-term variable remuneration.

By integrating sustainability targets into both the short-term variable remuneration (STI) and the long-term variable remuneration (LTI), social and environmental aspects are also taken into account, thereby promoting sustainable action by the Company.

Sustainable action is an integral part of our corporate strategy and ensures our social and economic future viability. This is in line with the clear focus on emerging technologies and the strategy of achieving a leading position in the relevant markets through organic growth. The integration of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) sustainability targets into variable remuneration incentivizes sustainable, future-oriented action and at the same time aims to create value for SUSS customers, employees and shareholders, as well as for the environment as a whole. Specific and measurable ESG targets derived from the corporate strategy are included in both short-term and long-term variable remuneration. In particular, SUSS also sees it as its duty to contribute to the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement, which is achieved by setting and implementing corresponding environmental targets (e.g., reduction of CO₂ emissions, improving energy efficiency, (further) development of environmentally friendly technologies and environmentally friendly tools and products).

Capital market orientation

The share-based structure of long-term variable remuneration in the form of virtual performance shares under a performance share plan, together with the integration of total shareholder return (TSR) as a performance criterion based on the development of the SUSS share price and benchmarked against the TSR of two indices, takes particular account of shareholders' interests. The convergence of interests between shareholders and members of the Management Board is further reinforced by the share purchase and holding obligations of Management Board members as part of share ownership guidelines.

Clarity and comprehensibility, GCGC

The remuneration system for the members of the Management Board is designed to be clear and comprehensible. It complies with the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act and takes into account the recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code in its current version dated April 28, 2022, which was published in the Federal Gazette on June 27, 2022 ("GCGC").

Procedure for determining, implementing and reviewing the Management Board remuneration system

The remuneration system for the members of the Management Board is determined by the Company's Supervisory Board in accordance with the statutory requirements and taking into account the recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code as amended. The Supervisory Board is supported in this by its Personnel and Nomination Committee. The SUSS Personnel and Nomination Committee is responsible for developing proposals for the Management Board remuneration system, which it submits to the Supervisory Board for discussion and resolution. The Supervisory Board and the Personnel and Nomination Committee may, if necessary, seek external advice, in particular on issues relating to the structure of the remuneration system and the assessment of the appropriateness of the remuneration. When hiring external remuneration consultants, their independence is considered.

The remuneration system resolved by the Supervisory Board will be submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval.

To ensure appropriate, competitive remuneration in line with the market, the Supervisory Board reviews the remuneration system and the remuneration amounts for the Management Board on a regular basis. If necessary, the Supervisory Board will adopt

changes. The remuneration system will be resubmitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval in case of material changes but at least every four years.

If the Annual General Meeting does not approve the remuneration system, the Supervisory Board will present a revised remuneration system for approval no later than at the following ordinary Annual General Meeting.

With regard to the avoidance and handling of (potential) conflicts of interest on the Supervisory Board, the general rules of the German Stock Corporation Act are also observed in the procedure for determining, implementing and reviewing the remuneration system, and the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code as amended are taken into account. Every member of the Supervisory Board shall disclose any conflicts of interest to the Chair of the Supervisory Board without delay. In its report to the Annual General Meeting, the Supervisory Board shall provide information on conflicts of interest and how they are handled. In the event of a conflict of interest, the Supervisory Board or committee member concerned does not take part in the discussion or vote in the Supervisory Board or the Personnel and Nomination Committee. Material conflicts of interest affecting a Supervisory Board member that are not merely temporary will result in the termination of the appointment.

Determination of the specific target total remuneration by the Supervisory Board (structure and amount)

Based on the remuneration system approved by the Annual General Meeting, the Supervisory Board determines the specific target total remuneration for each Management Board member in accordance with Section 87 (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). The specific target total remuneration is commensurate with the duties and performance of the Management Board member and the situation of the Company. In addition, the Supervisory Board ensures that the target total remuneration is structurally geared toward the long-term and sustainable development of SUSS and does not exceed the usual remuneration without special reasons.

When assessing the appropriateness of remuneration levels, the peer environment of SUSS (horizontal comparison) and the Company's internal remuneration structure (vertical comparison) are taken into account.

Horizontal – external comparison

To assess appropriateness at the horizontal level, the Supervisory Board compares the Management Board remuneration with that of a group of comparable domestic and international companies, as defined by the Supervisory Board. In doing so, it particularly considers SUSS's market position, including industry, size, country, and economic situation. The companies in the peer group are comparable listed equipment manufacturers for the semiconductor industry and selected companies in markets related to the semiconductor industry. In addition, the Supervisory Board also regularly uses listed companies of a comparable size from the TecDAX and, if applicable, the SDAX as part of the horizontal comparison. In this assessment, both SUSS's positioning within the peer group and the respective remuneration components are considered.

When determining the peer companies of SUSS (horizontal comparison), a group of domestic and foreign companies within the (extended) semiconductor segment was considered that are comparable to SUSS in terms of company size, company headquarters and economic situation. The companies are listed equipment manufacturers for the semiconductor industry and selected companies in markets related to the semiconductor industry from the TecDAX and the SDAX of comparable size in terms of number of employees, sales and market capitalization.

Vertical – internal comparison

To assess appropriateness at the vertical level, the Supervisory Board considers the ratio of Management Board remuneration to the remuneration of senior management and the rest of the SUSS workforce, including its development over time. For these purposes, senior management is defined by the Supervisory Board as the group of managers at the first (management) level below the Management Board.

Remuneration components and their relative share of target total remuneration and other components of the 2022 Remuneration System

The remuneration system for the members of the Management Board consists of non-performance-based (fixed) and performance-based (variable) remuneration components, the sum of which determines the total remuneration of a Management Board member.

The fixed, non-performance-based remuneration comprises the basic remuneration and fringe benefits, which may vary yearly in amount depending on the individual and the event.

The variable, performance-based remuneration consists of a short-term variable component in the form of an annual bonus (short-term incentive – STI) and a long-term variable component (long-term incentive – LTI) in the form of virtual performance shares with a four-year term (three-year performance period followed by a one-year vesting period). The Supervisory Board ensures that the target for variable remuneration is ambitious and demanding.

The target total remuneration comprises the sum of all remuneration components used for determining the total remuneration. To determine the target total remuneration, the variable remuneration components (i.e., STI and LTI) are each taken into account with a target achievement of 100%.

The following table shows the shares of remuneration components in the target total remuneration:

Compensation component	Share of the target total remuneration
Basic remuneration	~ 30–40%
Fringe benefits	~ 1–5%
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	~ 25–35%
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI)	~ 30–40%

When structuring the target total remuneration, the Supervisory Board ensures that the long-term variable remuneration exceeds the short-term variable remuneration. The remuneration structure is thus aligned with the long-term and sustainable development of SUSS while also ensuring the pursuit of annual operational targets.

The total remuneration for each Management Board position is capped at a maximum amount (“maximum remuneration”).

Other supplementary components of the remuneration system are malus and clawback rules for variable remuneration and the Share Ownership Guidelines with their share purchase and holding obligations for members of the Management Board.

Overview of the components of the 2022 Remuneration System

Compensation component	Description	
Non-performance-based remuneration		
Basic remuneration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fixed annual salary (paid in 12 monthly installments) 	
Fringe benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mainly company cars and insurance contributions 	
Performance-based remuneration		
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	Plan type	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target bonus 35% sales 35% net income 15% sustainability target (ESG criteria) 15% innovation and market position
	Performance criteria	
	Payout limit (cap)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 200% of the target amount
	Runtime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 year
	Plan type	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Virtual performance share plan 25% return on capital employed (ROCE) 25% sales growth 25% relative total shareholder return (TSR) 25% sustainability target (ESG criteria)
	Performance criteria	
	Payout limit (cap)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 300% of the target amount
	Runtime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4 years (three-year performance period and one-year vesting period)
	Long-term variable remuneration (LTI)	

Compensation component	Description
Other components	
Malus and clawback	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Withholding and/or clawback of variable remuneration components in justified cases – e.g., in the event of a serious and culpable breach of statutory or contractual obligations or obligations arising from the Statute of the Company or the rules of procedure for the Management Board, or in the event of payout on the basis of incorrect data
Share Ownership Guidelines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Obligation of the members of the Management Board to acquire shares in the Company to the value of 100% of the annual gross basic remuneration and to hold these shares at least until the end of their Management Board activity. At least 25% of the net amount of the performance-based remuneration paid (STI and LTI) must be invested in shares of the Company each year until this required number of shares is reached.
Maximum remuneration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limitation of payouts of all remuneration components (basic remuneration, fringe benefits, STI and LTI) resulting from a financial year to €3.0 million for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and to €2.5 million each for other ordinary members of the Management Board.

Maximum remuneration limits (maximum remuneration and limitation of variable remuneration)

In addition to caps for individual performance criteria and variable remuneration components, the Supervisory Board has defined a maximum remuneration in accordance with Section 87a (1)(2)(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) that covers all the remuneration components of the remuneration system. This includes basic remuneration, fringe benefits and variable remuneration (STI and LTI). This absolute cap (total cap) is set at €3.0 million for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and €2.5 million for each of the other regular Management Board members. The maximum remuneration limits the sum of the payments of all remuneration components resulting from a financial year and represents the maximum permissible framework within the remuneration system. In individual cases, the maximum achievable remuneration amounts agreed in individual contracts may be significantly lower than the maximum remuneration set in accordance with Section 87a (1)(2)(1) AktG.

Compliance with the maximum remuneration for the 2025 financial year – as a total cap for the sum of benefits promised to a Management Board member for their Management Board activities for the respective financial year – can only be reported after the LTI tranche of performance shares allocated in the 2025 reporting year has been paid out. Payments of the long-term variable remuneration component under the applicable LTI are allocated to the year in which the underlying LTI tranche is granted. Compliance with the maximum remuneration for the 2025 financial year can therefore only be reported after the performance period of the LTI tranche allocated in 2025 has expired. If the total benefits for a financial year exceed the defined maximum remuneration, the determined payout from the LTI allocated for the financial year is reduced by the excess amount. Taking into account the remuneration already granted/owed for the 2025 financial year (i.e., basic remuneration, fringe benefits, STI 2025 and the payout cap for the LTI 2025 (LTI cap of 300% of the LTI target amount), the total remuneration for the 2025 financial year cannot exceed the maximum remuneration set.

After the end of the 2025 financial year, the LTI tranches allocated to Management Board members in the 2023 financial year with the 2023–2025 performance period have been earned and their amount has been determined. The Supervisory Board can therefore report for the first time on compliance with the maximum remuneration planned for the 2023 financial year. The maximum remuneration for the financial year amounted to €3.0 million for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and €2.5 million for each of the other Management Board members. This was not achieved even after the (overall) target achievement of the 2023 LTI tranche was determined, meaning that the total remuneration (sum of all remuneration components for the 2023 financial year – i.e., basic remuneration 2023, fringe benefits 2023, STI 2023 and LTI 2023, as well as sign-on bonuses) did not exceed the maximum remuneration for any Management Board member. The maximum remuneration applicable for the 2023 financial year was complied with for both the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the other members of the Management Board. Burkhardt Frick received total remuneration of around €567.6 thousand for the 2023 financial year, which is below the maximum remuneration of €3.0 million applicable for the 2023 financial year. The total remuneration for the 2023 financial year is around €711.8 thousand for Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer and around €1.34 million for Dr. Thomas Rohe, which is also below the maximum remuneration of €2.5 million applicable for the 2023 financial year.

Components of the 2022 Remuneration System in detail

Non-performance-based remuneration

The fixed, non-performance-based remuneration of the Management Board members of SUSS MicroTec SE consists of the basic remuneration and fringe benefits.

Basic remuneration

The basic remuneration is a fixed cash payment for the financial year based in particular on the duties and responsibilities of the respective Management Board member. It is paid in twelve equal monthly installments at the end of each month.

Fringe benefits

Members of the Management Board may also be granted contractually stipulated fringe benefits in the form of noncash and other remuneration. These primarily include the provision of a company car for both business and private use, as well as contributions and allowances for insurance or the coverage of insurance premiums (e.g., inclusion in the Company's directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) with a deductible in accordance with Section 93 (2)(3) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), contributions to health and long-term care insurance, and accident insurance, which may also provide benefits to the Management Board member's heirs in the event of death). The Supervisory Board may grant other or additional fringe benefits customary in the market, such as the assumption of relocation costs for new hires. The type, amount, and duration of the noncash benefits may vary according to the personal situation of the Management Board members. Based on the maximum remuneration, a maximum amount for fringe benefits is set for each Management Board member per financial year.

To recruit qualified candidates for the Management Board, the Supervisory Board may supplement the remuneration of first-time members of the Management Board in an appropriate manner and in line with market conditions with a sign-on bonus – for example, to compensate for forfeited remuneration from previous employment relationships.

Performance-based remuneration

The performance-based remuneration consists of a short-term and a long-term variable remuneration component. The short-term variable component has a one-year term, while the long-term variable component is structured as virtual performance shares with a term of four years (consisting of a three-year performance period followed by a one-year vesting period). By structuring these remuneration components, which are detailed below, incentives are created to support the implementation of SUSS's corporate strategy and to promote the Company's long-term and sustainable development.

Short-term variable remuneration (STI)

Main features of the STI

The goal of short-term variable remuneration is to reward the operational implementation of corporate strategy. In this context, two financial targets – sales (35%) and net income (35%) – as well as a sustainability target (15%) and a target for innovation and market position (15%) were set as key performance criteria.



Performance criteria of the STI

Financial performance criteria – sales and net income with a weighting of 35% each

This portion of the STI is measured by the achievement of the two equally weighted financial performance criteria – sales and net income – each accounting for 35%, which are essential components of SUSS's corporate management.

- Sales:** Sales are those reported in the audited and approved consolidated financial statements. Sales is an important indicator for the Company and represents the value of goods and services that the Company has sold in a financial year. In order to remain competitive in the highly technical and specialized semiconductor industry, it is necessary to focus on sales and corresponding profitable growth, as this is the only way to generate the necessary funds for investments and innovations in the long term. SUSS's strategy aims for long-term sales growth, which can be operationalized by integrating sales as a performance criterion in the STI.

- Net income:** Net income for the financial year is the net income reported in the audited and approved consolidated financial statements. Net income is a direct derivation of sales less the costs incurred by the Company in a financial year. A positive net income reflects the Company's earning power and thus ultimately also its attractiveness for (potential) shareholders.

SUSS strives for sustainable growth, so that the growth in net income should be at or above the level of sales growth. The use of net income in the STI takes this objective into account.


Before the start of a financial year, the Supervisory Board sets ambitious targets (including thresholds and caps) for each of these financial performance criteria. The target values of the two financial performance criteria are derived from the budget planning approved by the Supervisory Board for the respective financial year.

Target achievement for the two financial performance criteria is determined by comparing the actual value achieved in the financial year with the target value. Target achievement is converted into a payout factor for each performance criterion using a bonus curve. If target achievement is lower than the threshold, the payout factor for the performance criterion is 0%, meaning total failure to meet the financial targets is possible. If the target is achieved at the threshold level, the payout factor is 50%. If the actual value corresponds to the target value, the payout factor is 100%. If the target achievement is equal to or greater than the cap, the payout factor of the financial performance criterion is 200%.

The 2022 Remuneration System also includes additional conditions for the sales and net income targets, which are based on break-even sales and break-even net income. If these "minimum levels" are not reached, the achievement of the corresponding target is 0%, regardless of the target achievement determined using a bonus curve.

For the financial targets, the bonus curves are diagrammed as follows:

Payout factor in %



Nonfinancial performance criterion – sustainability target with a weighting of 15%

This portion of the STI is measured by the achievement of the nonfinancial sustainability target, which is weighted at 15% in total. The sustainability target consists of up to two nonfinancial performance criteria from the areas of environmental, social, and governance (“ESG performance criteria”), which are derived from SUSS’s sustainability strategy. The inclusion of sustainability targets in the STI reflects SUSS’s aim to provide incentives to implement the sustainability aspects of the corporate strategy. This approach further highlights SUSS’s commitment to a holistic perception of its corporate responsibility and ensures sustainable business success.

Each year, the Supervisory Board, at its own discretion, defines up to two equally weighted ESG performance criteria underlying the assessment of the sustainability target, which it selects from the following categories:

Category	ESG aspects
Environmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduction of CO₂ emissions • Optimization of the use of resources • Reduction of waste • Circular economy
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employee satisfaction and development • Diversity • Inclusion • Occupational health and safety
Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compliance, in particular prevention of corruption and bribery • Risk management • Responsible supply chain • Further development of the sustainability strategy • Reporting and communication

Before the start of a financial year, the Supervisory Board sets ambitious targets for the ESG performance criteria. The targets are based, among other things, on the operationalization of the SUSS sustainability strategy.


With regard to the ESG targets determined by the Supervisory Board, a distinction must be made between quantitative and qualitative targets. Qualitative criteria that cannot be measured precisely should only be used in exceptional cases. In such a case, the Supervisory Board ensures that the qualitative criteria are comprehensible and verifiable in all cases in accordance with the reasoning of the German Corporate Governance Code. The specific ESG targets, including an explanation of how they were applied, are disclosed in the remuneration report.

For each quantitative ESG target, the Supervisory Board defines a threshold and a cap in addition to the target. Achievement of quantitative ESG targets is determined by comparing the actual value achieved for the respective ESG target in the financial year with the target value. Target achievement is converted into a payout factor for each performance criterion using a bonus curve. If target achievement is lower than the threshold, the payout factor for the respective performance criterion is 0%, meaning total failure to meet the sustainability target is possible. If the target is achieved at the threshold level, the payout factor is 50%. If the actual value corresponds to the target value, the payout factor is 100%. If the target achievement is equal to or greater than the cap, the payout factor is 200%.

For the quantitative ESG targets, the bonus curve is diagrammed as follows:



The Supervisory Board assesses achievement of each qualitative ESG target after the end of the financial year. In doing so, the Supervisory Board can set target achievement at five levels. The corresponding payout factor can range from 0%, in the case of a missed target, to 200%, in the case of significantly exceeding the targets. Total failure to meet the sustainability target is therefore possible. The bonus curve for qualitative ESG targets is diagrammed as follows:



Nonfinancial performance criterion – innovation and market position with weighting of 15%

This part of the STI is measured by the achievement of the non-financial target “innovation and market position,” which is weighted at 15% overall. To remain successful as a manufacturer of high-tech tools for the semiconductor industry in a dynamic and highly competitive market environment, SUSS’s corporate strategy focuses on securing innovation and technology leadership while further expanding its market position. Progress in the areas of innovation and market position, which enhance SUSS’s future viability and competitiveness while contributing to the Company’s long-term development, is therefore incentivized.

Each year, the Supervisory Board defines up to two equally weighted performance criteria for assessing the “innovation and market position” target at its discretion, selecting from the following aspects:

Category	Aspects
Innovation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of key innovation projects and important research & development projects • (Further) development of innovative and future-oriented (key) technologies and digital business processes
Market position	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintaining and expanding market position, gaining market share • Successful development of new growth markets

Before a financial year begins, the Supervisory Board sets ambitious targets for the performance criteria for innovation and/or market position.

With regard to the targets determined by the Supervisory Board, a distinction must be made between quantitative and qualitative targets. The nonfinancial target “innovation and market position” is based – as far as possible – on clearly defined and measurable quantitative criteria, the achievement of which is used to measure the performance of the members of the Management Board.

Qualitative criteria that cannot be measured precisely should only be used in exceptional cases; in such cases, the Supervisory Board ensures that the qualitative criteria are comprehensible and verifiable in all cases, in accordance with the explanatory memorandum to the German Corporate Governance Code. The relevant comments on the nonfinancial ESG performance criteria of the STI apply accordingly to the determination of the specific criteria and the determination of target achievement by the Supervisory Board. The specific targets, including an explanation of how they were applied, are disclosed in the Remuneration Report.

Determination of overall target achievement and payment methods

The overall target achievement level (“overall target achievement”) is calculated by multiplying the payout factors of the performance criteria by their respective weightings and then adding them together. To determine the payout amount, the overall target achievement is multiplied by the STI target amount, with the payout amount capped at 200% of the target amount.

Subsequent adjustment of the defined performance criteria or the target values for the performance criteria within the meaning of recommendation G.8 of the German Corporate Governance Code (repricing) is excluded. However, the Supervisory Board is able to take extraordinary developments into account to an appropriate extent in accordance with Recommendation G.11 German Corporate Governance Code. In this respect, the Supervisory Board is entitled under the Management Board service contracts to adjust the variable remuneration components at its reasonable discretion in the event of extraordinary developments, whereby the adjustment should be limited to an adjustment of the assessment basis of the variable remuneration components excluding the extraordinary developments ("as if" calculation). If the Supervisory Board makes use of this option, the reasons for an adjustment and its scope will be communicated in the remuneration report for the financial year.

The STI is paid out in cash and becomes due with the next regular payroll run after the approval of SUSS's consolidated financial statements.

If the Management Board employment contract begins or ends in the current financial year, the target amount is reduced pro rata temporis to the date of the beginning or end.

Target values and target achievement (STI) for the 2025 financial year

Financial targets, each with a weighting of 35% of the STI for the 2025 financial year

in € thousand	Threshold	Target	Cap	Weighting in %	Results for 2025	Target achievement level in %
Sales	441,769	490,854	589,025	35%	503,180	112,6%
Consolidated net income	48,623	54,025	59,428	35%	46,107	0%

Sustainability goals are integrated into both short-term variable remuneration (short-term incentive – STI) and long-term variable remuneration (long-term incentive – LTI). This creates incentives to take social and ecological aspects into account and to make corporate management sustainable. Sustainable action is an integral part of SUSS's corporate strategy and ensures the Company's future social and economic viability. The integration of sustainability targets from the areas of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) as components of variable remuneration incentivizes sustainable and future-oriented action. Specific and measurable ESG targets derived from the corporate strategy are included in both short-term and long-term variable remuneration.

Nonfinancial targets, each with a weighting of 15% of the STI for the 2025 financial year

Nonfinancial STI targets	Nonfinancial performance criteria	Description of sustainability goals	Level achieved in 2025 financial year	Target achievement level
Sustainability target	ESG "environment" performance criterion with a weighting of 50%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Survey of the readiness (current status of suppliers with regard to sustainability in the supply chain) of existing suppliers using a checklist Evaluation of checklists and definition of critical suppliers and categorization Concept for the authorization and qualification of suppliers according to the individual categories 	200%	100%
	ESG "social" performance criterion with a weighting of 50%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementation of measures to improve employee satisfaction, measured by the quarterly employee engagement score 	0%	
"Market position & innovation" target	"Innovation" performance criterion with weighting of 50%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Successful implementation of R & D transformation projects regarding the creation, redesign and documentation of a modern process landscape Development of an organizational plan and implementation of the above-mentioned process landscape 	100%	150%
	"Market position" performance criterion with weighting of 50%	<p>Market penetration with key products:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regular creation/adjustment of market and customer-oriented product and technology roadmaps as a consequence of an established product policy/portfolio management process Tripling the output of an important tool Delivery of a beta tool in one of our core segments 	200%	

Overall target achievement STI 2025

For the 2025 financial year, this results in the following total target achievement and the following individual payout amounts for the STI:

STI 2025 – Summary


		Target amount (€)	Target achievement - sales (weighting: 35%)	Target achievement - net income for the financial year (weighting: 35%)	Target achievement - sustainability target (weighting: 15%)	Target achievement - innovation & market position (weighting: 15%)	Overall target achievement	Payout amount (€)
Member of the Management Board	Burkhardt Frick (CEO)	260,000.00	112.6%	0%	100%	150%	77%	200,200.00
	Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer (CFO)	240,000.00	112.6%	0%	100%	150%	77%	184,800.00
	Dr. Thomas Rohe (COO)	240,000.00	112.6%	0%	100%	150%	77%	184,800.00

Long-term variable remuneration (LTI) – key principles of the LTI

The LTI is designed to support the sustainable and long-term business development of SUSS. In the 2022 Remuneration System, this is done with a share-based approach using virtual performance shares (VPS). This capital market-oriented structure for the LTI links the interests of shareholders and Management Board

members even more closely. Overall, the incentive is created to increase the value of the Company on a long-term and sustainable basis.

The LTI is granted as an annual tranche in the form of VPS. The term of an LTI tranche is four years, consisting of a three-year performance period followed by a one-year vesting period.



The number of conditionally allocated VPS is determined by dividing the target amount of the LTI by the average share price of SUSS MicroTec SE (calculated as the arithmetic mean of the closing prices in the XETRA trading system or an equivalent successor system of Deutsche Börse AG) over the last 60 trading days before the start of the performance period. The number of VPS can increase or decrease depending on the achievement of the two financial performance criteria (return on capital employed [ROCE] and sales growth), a performance criterion based on the development of the share price (relative total shareholder return [TSR] compared to two peer groups) and a sustainability target. The four LTI performance criteria are equally weighted, each contributing 25% to the overall target achievement.

Performance criteria of the LTI

Financial performance-based criteria – ROCE and sales growth, each weighted at 25%

This part of the LTI is measured by the achievement of the two financial performance criteria, ROCE and sales growth. Both performance targets support the implementation of SUSS's corporate strategy and align the LTI with the Company's long-term development.

- **ROCE:** ROCE for the performance period is calculated as the equally weighted average of the actual ROCE values for the individual financial years in the performance period. The actual ROCE value for each financial year is calculated as the quotient of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as reported in the audited and approved consolidated financial statements of the Company, the average capital employed based on the Quarterly Reports, and the audited and approved consolidated financial statements in the respective financial year. ROCE is an important profitability indicator that describes the return on capital employed. The individual components of ROCE are each strategically important key figures for the Company. The optimization of the individual components leads accordingly to an improvement in the ROCE and therefore to a better use of the capital employed in the Company. The average ROCE within the performance period is definitive for achieving the target.


- **Sales growth:** Sales growth refers to the increase in Group sales within the performance period and is measured as the compound annual growth rate (CAGR). In principle, the Company should grow at least as fast as the market volume of the reference markets over the cycle, since otherwise there is a risk of losing market share in the medium and long term. Only through sustainable sales growth can the Company succeed in maintaining its leading market position in the relevant target markets in the long term and generate sustainable positive cash flows and thus funds for investments such as innovations or research and development.

Before the start of a financial year, the Supervisory Board sets ambitious targets (including thresholds and caps) for each of the financial performance criteria for the new tranche. These values remain applicable throughout the three-year performance period of a tranche. The target to be set by the Supervisory Board is based on the expected return on capital employed according to the corporate strategy (for the ROCE performance criterion) or on the strategically planned sales growth (for the sales growth performance criterion) so that a high strategic relevance of the performance criteria can be ensured.

The determination of target achievement for the financial performance criteria is made by the Supervisory Board after the approval of the consolidated financial statements for the final year of the performance period. Target achievement for the financial performance criteria is determined by comparing the respective actual value achieved during the performance period with the defined target value. Target achievement is converted into a payout factor for each performance criterion using a bonus curve. If the respective target achievement is lower than the threshold, the payout factor for the respective performance criterion is 0%, meaning total failure to meet the respective financial targets is possible. If the target is achieved at the threshold level, the payout factor is 50%. If the actual value corresponds to the target value, the payout factor is 100%. If the target achievement is equal to or greater than the cap, the payout factor is 200%.

For the financial targets, the bonus curves are diagrammed as follows:

Payout factor in %




Financial, share price-based performance criterion – relative TSR, weighted at 25%

The relative total shareholder return (TSR) as an additional performance criterion considers the development of the SUSS share, including dividends, and compares SUSS's TSR performance with the TSR performance of two peer groups: the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index as the international industry index and the DAX-sector Technology Index as the German index with a technology focus. The determination of achievement is based on the extent to which the TSR of SUSS's shares exceeds or falls short of the TSR of the companies in the two peer groups over the performance period. The share-based provision of the LTI and the integration of a share price-based performance criterion strengthen the alignment of interests between the Management Board members and shareholders.

Target achievement is calculated using the TSR outperformance of SUSS compared to the two benchmark indices. The outperformance is the difference between the TSR of SUSS's shares and the TSR of the respective peer group, expressed in %-points. An identical TSR performance of SUSS and the respective benchmark index results in a TSR outperformance of 0% and corresponds to

a target achievement of 100%. The threshold of –30% means that the TSR performance of SUSS is 30%-points below the index performance and corresponds to a payout of 30%. In the case of a +30% outperformance of SUSS compared to the benchmark index, the payout is capped at 200%.

The bonus curve is diagrammed as follows:



The payout factors determined based on the TSR outperformance versus the respective benchmark index are taken into account on an equally weighted basis when determining the final payout factor for the relative TSR.

Nonfinancial performance criterion – sustainability target with a weighting of 25%

The explanations of the nonfinancial ESG performance criteria of the STI apply analogously to the sustainability target, which is the fourth overall performance criterion of the LTI, with the proviso that the targets are based on three financial years (performance period) instead of just one. The Supervisory Board specifically ensures that different nonfinancial ESG performance criteria are selected for the STI and LTI in order to rule out double incentivization. The selection of ESG performance criteria for the sustainability target is aligned with SUSS's sustainability strategy.

Determination of overall target achievement and payment methods

To determine the overall target achievement in the LTI, the calculated payout factors for ROCE, sales growth, relative TSR, and the sustainability target are multiplied by 25% each and then added together. This means they are equally weighted in the overall target achievement.

The final number of VPS will be determined after the end of the three-year performance period. For this purpose, the number of VPS conditionally granted at the start of the performance period is multiplied by the overall target achievement. In a next step, the resulting final number of VPS is multiplied by the sum of the average share price of SUSS (arithmetic mean of the closing prices in the XETRA trading system or an equivalent successor system of Deutsche Börse AG) of the last 60 trading days before the end of the performance period and the cumulative dividend paid out during the performance period (the “dividend equivalent”) in order to determine the payout amount. The amount thereby designated for payment is not paid out until after a one-year vesting period, so the total inflow does not occur until four years after allocation of the relevant LTI tranche at the earliest. The payout amount is capped at a total of 300% of the LTI target amount.

The VPS are paid out in cash. The Supervisory Board is entitled to pay out the LTI in whole or in part in the form of SUSS shares instead of a cash payment.

Subsequent adjustment of the defined performance criteria or the target values or comparison parameters for the performance criteria within the meaning of recommendation G.8 of the German Corporate Governance Code (repricing) is excluded. However, the Supervisory Board is able to take extraordinary developments into account to an appropriate extent in accordance with Recommendation G.11 German Corporate Governance Code. In this respect, the Supervisory Board is entitled under the Management Board service contracts to adjust the variable remuneration components at its reasonable discretion in the event of extraordinary developments, whereby the adjustment should be limited to an adjustment of the assessment basis of the variable remuneration components excluding the extraordinary developments (“as if” calculation). If the Supervisory Board makes use of this option, the reasons for an adjustment and its content are communicated in the remuneration report for the financial year.

LTI tranches 2025 issued to all current members of the Management Board

LTI tranche 2025–2027: Targets for the LTI tranche issued in the reporting year with performance period 2025–2027

Financial performance criteria (2022 Remuneration System, each with a weighting of 25% of LTI) – sustainability target reported separately

	Threshold for 50% target achievement	Target for 100% target achievement	Cap for 200% target achievement	Overall target achievement level ¹
Return on capital employed	27.9%	29.9%	33.9%	Performance period not yet completed
Sales growth	6.99% p.a.	7.96% p.a.	10.47% p.a.	
Relative TSR ²	–30%	0%	+30%	
Sustainability target	Nearly achieved Target achievement 50%	Fully achieved Target achievement 100%	Significantly exceeded Target achievement 200%	

1 The target achievement levels are determined after the end of the three-year performance period on December 31, 2027.

2 The percentage figures for relative total shareholder return (TSR) are the TSR outperformance compared to two benchmark indices calculated using the average closing prices of the last 30 trading days of the SUSS MicroTec share in XETRA trading.

Nonfinancial performance criteria: Sustainability-related targets for the LTI tranche with performance period 2025–2027 (2022 Remuneration System with weighting of 25% of the LTI)

In the coming years, SUSS will define and implement further measures to reduce CO₂ emissions across the Group. Measured against the transition plan of the SUSS climate strategy and based on Scope 1 & 2 emissions of approx. 1,500 tons of CO₂ in 2024 (provisional value), the Company is aiming for the following targets:

			Overall target achievement level ¹
Sustainability target	Threshold for 50% target achievement	CO ₂ emissions Scope 1 & 2 will not exceed 900 tons Group-wide in 2027	Performance period not yet completed
	Target for 100% target achievement	CO ₂ emissions Scope 1 & 2 will not exceed 700 tons Group-wide in 2027	
	Target for 150% target achievement	CO ₂ emissions Scope 1 & 2 will not exceed 500 tons Group-wide in 2027	
	Cap for 200% target achievement	CO ₂ emissions Scope 1 & 2 will not exceed 300 tons Group-wide in 2027	

¹ The degree of target achievement is determined after the end of the three-year performance period on December 31, 2027.

The above definition of the targets and determination of target achievement for the LTI tranches 2025–2027 issued on the basis of the 2022 Remuneration System apply to the Management Board members Burkhardt Frick (CEO), Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer (CFO) and Dr. Thomas Rohe (COO) and thus to all current members of the Management Board of SUSS MicroTec SE.

LTI tranches issued to all current members of the Management Board – 2024

LTI tranches 2024–2026: Targets for the LTI tranche issued in the 2024 financial year with performance period 2024–2026

Financial performance criteria (2022 Remuneration System, each with a weighting of 25% of LTI) – sustainability target reported separately

	Threshold for 50% target achievement	Target for 100% target achievement	Cap for 200% target achievement	Overall target achievement level ¹
Return on capital employed	20.9%	23.9%	26.9%	
Sales growth	9.75%	13.93%	18.11%	
Relative TSR ²	–30%	0%	+30%	Performance period not yet completed
Sustainability target	Nearly achieved Target achievement 50%	Fully achieved Target achievement 100%	Significantly exceeded Target achievement 200%	

¹ The target achievement levels will be determined after the end of the three-year performance period on December 31, 2026.

² The percentage figures for relative total shareholder return (TSR) are the TSR outperformance compared to two benchmark indices calculated using the average closing prices of the last 30 trading days of the SUSS MicroTec share in XETRA trading.

Nonfinancial performance criteria: Sustainability-related targets for the LTI tranche with performance period 2024–2026 (2022 Remuneration System with 25% weighting in the LTI)

The international Scope 1, 2 and 3 CO₂ consumption of the SUSS Group amounted to approx. 160,000 t in 2022. With the help of sustainable products, innovation and technology, and consideration of the circular economy, the CO₂ footprint of SUSS can be sustainably reduced. The product carbon footprint plays a crucial role in this: It should be determined and developed for each product group in the long term. Typical customer use cases are derived from the specification of the device. The actual application at the customer may vary.

			Overall target achievement level ¹
Sustainability target	Threshold for 50% target achievement	Creation of the prerequisites for calculating the product carbon footprint (Scope 1, 2 and 3).	Performance period not yet completed
	Target for 100% target achievement	Determination of the product carbon footprint (Scope 1, 2 and 3) for a pilot project	
	Cap for 200% target achievement	Calculation of the product carbon footprint (Scope 1, 2 and 3) for all current tools.	

¹ The target achievement levels will be determined at the end of the three-year performance period on December 31, 2026.

LTI tranches issued to all current members of the Management Board – 2023

LTI tranche 2023–2025: Targets for the LTI tranche issued in the 2023 financial year with performance period 2023–2025:

Financial performance criteria (2022 Remuneration System, each with a weighting of 25% of LTI) – sustainability target reported separately.

Due to the sale of SMO (MicroOptics business unit) in the first quarter of the 2024 financial year and the associated significant change in the SUSS Group, the Supervisory Board made use of the option recommended in G.11 of the German Corporate Governance Code and in February 2024 adjusted the targets of the 2023–2025 LTI tranche already issued in 2023 by excluding the SMO business. For details and an explanation of this adjustment, please refer to the Remuneration Report 2024.

LTI tranche 2023–2025: Targets for the LTI tranche issued in the 2023 financial year with performance period 2023–2025:

Financial performance criteria (2022 Remuneration System, each with a weighting of 25% of LTI) – sustainability target reported separately.

	Target for 50% target achievement	Target for 100% target achievement	Cap for 200% target achievement	Level achieved in 2025 financial year (final status 12/31/2025)	Target achievement level for the performance criteria	Overall target achievement level
Return on capital employed	19.9%	22.9%	25.9%	25.2%	176%	
Sales growth	7.06% p.a.	10.09% p.a.	13.12% p.a.	24.62%	200%	174%
Relative TSR ¹	No threshold defined	0%	30%	6%	120%	
Sustainability target (index) ²	See table below	See table below	See table below	Significantly exceeded	200%	

1 The percentage figures for the relative total shareholder return (TSR) represent the TSR outperformance calculated using the average closing prices of SUSS shares over the last 30 trading days in the XETRA trading system.

2 Targets and thresholds shown in table below

Sustainability target: Sustainability-related targets for the LTI tranche 2023 with performance period 2023–2025 (2022 Remuneration System with 25% weighting in the LTI)

	Sustainability target: Improve sustainability ratings of SUSS		Level achieved in 2025 financial year (final status 12/31/2025)	Overall level of achievement
Sustainability target: Improve sustainability rating of SUSS	Threshold for 50% target achievement	No downgrade in ISS and Sustainalytics ratings (compared to 2022/early 2023) and a rating of Good or better from EcoVadis or an equivalent agency	No downgrade in the ratings of ISS and Sustainalytics The rating from two rating agencies has improved compared to the base period (2022/early 2023)	200%
	Target for 100% target achievement	Achievement of the aforementioned threshold targets plus: The rating from one of the three rating agencies listed above has improved by one category (compared to 2022/early 2023).		
	Cap for 200% target achievement	Achievement of the aforementioned threshold targets plus: The rating from two of the three rating agencies listed above has improved by one category (compared to 2022/early 2023).		

The above determination of the targets and determination of target achievement for the LTI tranches 2023–2025 issued on the basis of the 2022 Remuneration System apply to the Management Board members Burkhardt Frick (CEO), Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer (CFO) and Dr. Thomas Rohe (COO) and thus to all current members of the Management Board of SUSS MicroTec SE. The following table shows the allocated LTI target amount for each Management Board member as well as the payout amount of the LTI tranche 2023–2025 resulting from the overall target achievement and the share price performance. The payout amount will only be paid out after the expiry of a one-year vesting period with the settlement run at the Company following approval of the consolidated financial statements for the 2026 financial year, but in no case before the expiry of four years following the issue date of the 2023–2025 LTI tranche. The inflow to the members of the Management Board will therefore take place in May 2027.

2023 LTI tranche issued to former Management Board member Oliver Albrecht
LTI tranche 2023–2025: Targets for the LTI tranche issued in 2023 with performance period 2023–2025 (2021 Remuneration System, each with a weighting of 1/3 of LTI)

Due to the sale of SMO (“MicroOptics” business unit) in the first quarter of 2024 and the associated significant change in the SUSS Group, the Supervisory Board made use of the option recommended in G.11 of the German Corporate Governance Code and in February 2024 adjusted the targets of the 2023–2025 LTI tranche already issued in 2023 by excluding the SMO business. The targets for the former Management Board member Oliver Albrecht correspond to the targets for the LTI tranches 2023–2025, which were allocated to the current Management Board members in the financial year, in terms of ROCE, sales growth and relative TSR (see table p. 27). A sustainability target was not set in accordance with the 2021 Remuneration System.

Overall target achievement and payout amounts from the LTI tranches 2023–2025

Overall target achievement of the LTI tranche 2023–2025

	LTI target amount (grant amount pro rata) in €	Allocation price in € ¹	Conditionally allocated (preliminary) number of performance shares	Overall target achievement in %	Final number of performance shares	Payout price in € ²	Payout amount in € ³
Burkhardt Frick (start date: 09/11/2023) ⁴	84,383.56 (pro rata)		6,236.78	174%	10,852.00		253,150.68
Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer (start date: 07/01/2023) ⁴	130,000.00 (pro rata)		9,608.28	174%	16,718.41		390,000.00
		13.53				34.67	
Dr. Thomas Rohe (start date: 05/01/2021)	260,000.00		19,216.56	174%	33,436.81		780,000.00
Oliver Albrecht (departure date: 04/30/2023)	34,166.67		2,525.25	165%	4,166.66		102,500.00

1 The average closing price (arithmetic mean) of SUSS MicroTec SE shares in the XETRA trading system of Deutsche Börse AG over the last 60 trading days before the start of the performance period.

2 The average closing price (arithmetic mean) of SUSS MicroTec SE shares in the XETRA trading system of Deutsche Börse AG over the last 60 trading days before the end of the performance period.

3 The payout amounts are subject to a cap of 300% of the target amount.

4 The respective LTI target amount was reduced pro rata temporis due to the start and end of Management Board activity during the year in 2023 in line with the duration of Management Board service in the 2023–2025 performance period.

Other regulations relevant to remuneration

Malus and clawback

The Supervisory Board has the option to withhold (malus) or reclaim (clawback) variable remuneration components in part or in full in the cases listed below.

In the event of at least one serious and culpable breach by the Management Board member of statutory or contractual obligations or obligations arising from the Statute of the Company or the rules of procedure for the Management Board, the Supervisory Board may, at its due discretion, reduce and withhold variable remuneration components that have not yet been paid out or reclaim variable remuneration components that have already been paid out. An assertion of the clawback right is excluded if the breach of obligation dates back more than 10 years.

If variable remuneration components were wrongly paid out to the Management Board member based on incorrect data, the Supervisory Board may, at its due discretion, demand the full or partial return of the difference resulting from the recalculation of the amount of variable remuneration compared to the amount paid out.

The clawback and malus rights shall also exist if the position or employment relationship of the Management Board member has already ended at the time the clawback and/or malus rights are asserted. The Management Board member may not appeal the fact that the reclaimed variable remuneration is no longer available in their assets. Claims by the Company for damages, in particular under Section 93 (2)(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the right of the Company to revoke the appointment pursuant to Section 84 (4) AktG, and the right of the Company to terminate the employment contract without notice (Section 626 (1) of the German Civil Code [BGB]) shall remain unaffected.

No facts were identified in the reporting year that would have justified a corresponding withholding or clawback. Accordingly, no use was made of the option to withhold or claw back variable remuneration components

Share Ownership Guidelines


To further align the interests of the Management Board and shareholders, all members of the Management Board are subject to Share Ownership Guidelines (SOG), which oblige the members of the Management Board to make a substantial personal investment in SUSS shares for the duration of their appointment.

The Management Board members are therefore required to invest an amount equivalent to 100% of their annual gross base remuneration in SUSS shares and to hold these shares at least until the termination of their board membership ("share investment target"). Until the SOG target is reached, the members of the Management Board are obliged to invest at least 25% of the respective (net) payment from the variable remuneration (STI and LTI) in SUSS shares ("annual minimum investment amount").

The Supervisory Board believes that the conditions set out in the Share Ownership Guidelines are balanced. A potentially prohibitive effect on the recruitment of candidates for the Management Board is avoided without compromising the strategic objectives.

The employment contracts concluded in the 2023 financial year with Burkhardt Frick (CEO) and Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer (CFO) as well as Dr. Thomas Rohe (COO), whose employment relationship was transferred from the 2021 Remuneration System to the 2022 Remuneration System, mean that the Share Ownership Guidelines have been included in the employment relationships of all current members of the Management Board of SUSS Micro-Tec SE. The aforementioned annual minimum investment obligation was applied for the first time in the 2024 financial year, when the short-term variable remuneration (STI) for the 2023 financial year was paid out in March 2024, following the approval of the consolidated financial statements as of December 31, 2023.

Share Ownership Guide



The following tables provide an overview of the investment amounts made by the members of the Management Board up to December 31, 2025.

Share purchases by members of the Management Board as part of the Share Ownership Program in the 2025 financial year

Management Board member	Number of shares	Investment amount in € at the time of acquisition (share of the annual minimum investment obligation in %)	Minimum investment obligation in € in the 2025 ¹ financial year
Burkhardt Frick (CEO)	1,939	65,194.37 (100%)	65,168.45
Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer (CFO)	1,735	58,335.35 (100%)	58,302.75
Dr. Thomas Rohe (COO)	1,686	56,687.84 (100%)	56,657.34

¹ Sum of at least 25% of the annual (net) payouts from the variable remuneration (LTI and STI) since the start of the respective build-up phase.

Shares held by the Management Board as part of the Share Ownership Program as of December 31, 2025

Management Board member	Number of shares	Total investment amount in € as of 31/12/2025 (share of total investment obligation in %)	Total minimum investment obligation in € as of 12/31/2025	Minimum investment requirement in €
Burkhardt Frick (CEO)	5,184	155,318.50 (51.8%)	71,722.31	300,000
Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer (CFO)	1,931	67,607.96 (24.6%)	67,599.68	275,000
Dr. Thomas Rohe (COO)	2,077	75,220.28 (27.4%)	75,182.16	275,000

Starting or departing during the year

In the event of a Management Board appointment commencing or ending during the course of a financial year, the basic remuneration, the target amount of the STI, and the target amount of the LTI are reduced pro rata temporis in accordance with the length of service in the relevant financial year. Under certain circumstances, variable remuneration entitlements may expire without replacement depending on the reason for departure as described above.

Extraordinary developments

In accordance with recommendation G.11 of the German Corporate Governance Code, the Supervisory Board has the option to take reasonable account of extraordinary developments in the performance-based remuneration.

Post-contractual noncompetition agreement

The employment contracts of the current members of the Management Board contain a post-contractual noncompetition clause of one year, which the Company can also waive. If the post-contractual noncompetition clause is exercised, a compensation payment amounting to 50% of the most recent basic remuneration and 50% of the most recent short-term variable remuneration (STI) must be paid to the respective Management Board member for the duration of the noncompetition clause. Any severance payment will be deducted from the compensation.

Remuneration of Management Board members in the 2025 financial year

The tables below show the respective target remuneration for the 2025 financial year for Management Board members in office in the 2025 reporting year. This includes the target remuneration promised for the financial year, which is granted in the event of 100% target achievement, supplemented by details of the individually achievable minimum and maximum remuneration. There are no differences in the basic remuneration and fringe benefits.

Target remuneration of Management Board members set in the reporting year

Target remuneration of current Management Board members

Burkhardt Frick, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Start date: September 11, 2023

Target remuneration in €	2025 (100%)	2025 (min)	2025 (max)	2024
Basic remuneration	300,000.00	300,000.00	300,000.00	300,000.00
Fringe benefits (fixed) ¹	21,885.60	21,885.60	21,885.60	20,442.48
Total	321,885.60	321,885.60	321,885.60	320,442.48
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	260,000.00	-	520,000.00	260,000.00
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2024 (performance period 01/01/2024 to 12/31/2026 and vesting period 01/01/2027 to 12/31/2027)	-	-	-	275,000.00
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2025 (performance period 01/01/2025 to 12/31/2027 and vesting period 01/01/2028 to 12/31/2028) ²	275,000.00	-	825,000.00	-
Target total remuneration	856,885.60	321,885.60	1,666,885.60	855,442.48

¹ The fringe benefits include contributions to voluntary pension insurance, the noncash benefit of a company car that can also be used privately or a car allowance, as well as contributions to health insurance.

² The amount corresponds to the maximum achievable payout amount, which is limited to 300% of the target amount. The amount of the LTI payout is calculated from the final number of performance shares, which depends on the overall target achievement level (0 to 200%) at the end of the performance period, multiplied by the sum of the average closing price (arithmetic mean) of the SUSS MicroTec SE share in XETRA trading on Deutsche Börse AG on the last 60 trading days before the end of the performance period and the cumulative dividend paid out during the performance period (the "dividend equivalent").

Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Start date: July 1, 2023

Target remuneration in €	2025 (100%)	2025 (min)	2025 (max)	2024
Basic remuneration	275,000.00	275,000.00	275,000.00	275,000.00
Fringe benefits (fixed) ¹	23,651.64	23,651.64	23,651.64	22,208.52
Other (sign-on and retention bonus) ²	40,000.00	40,000.00	40,000.00	40,000.00
Total	338,651.64	338,651.64	338,651.64	337,208.52
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	240,000.00	-	480,000.00	240,000.00
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2024 (performance period from 01/01/2024 to 12/31/2026 and vesting period from 01/01/2027 to 12/31/2027)	-	-	-	260,000.00
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2025 (performance period 01/01/2025 to 12/31/2027 and vesting period 01/01/2028 to 12/31/2028) ³	260,000.00	-	780,000.00	-
Target total remuneration	838,651.64	338,651.64	1,598,651.64	837,208.52

- The fringe benefits include allowances for voluntary pension insurance, the noncash benefit of a company car that can also be used privately or a car allowance as well as health insurance contributions.
- Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer has been promised a one-off sign-on bonus of €100,000 if she takes up her position on July 1, 2023 – particularly in view of the fact that her employment contract with the previous company was originally due to run until October 31, 2023. In addition, Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer was granted a retention bonus, which will be paid annually with the next payroll after the end of each service year (i.e., the annual reporting date) during the three-year employment period, in the amount of €40,000 – provided that her appointment and employment as a Management Board member remain in effect as of the respective annual reporting date.
- The amount corresponds to the maximum achievable payout amount, which is limited to 300% of the target amount. The amount of the LTI payout is calculated from the final number of performance shares, which depends on the overall target achievement level (0 to 200%) at the end of the performance period, multiplied by the sum of the average closing price (arithmetic mean) of the SUSS MicroTec SE share in XETRA trading on Deutsche Börse AG on the last 60 trading days before the end of the performance closing period and the cumulative dividend paid out during the performance period (the "dividend equivalent").

Dr. Thomas Rohe, Chief Operations Officer (COO), Start date: May 1, 2021

Target remuneration in €	2025 (100%)	2025 (min)	2025 (max)	2024
Basic remuneration	275,000.00	275,000.00	275,000.00	275,000.00
Fringe benefits (fixed) ¹	29,107.90	29,107.90	29,107.90	33,492.88
Total	304,107.90	304,107.90	304,107.90	308,492.88
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	240,000.00	-	480,000.00	240,000.00
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2024 (performance period 01/01/2024 to 12/31/2026 and vesting period 01/01/2027 to 12/31/2027)	-	-	-	260,000.00
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2025 (performance period 01/01/2025 to 12/31/2027 and vesting period 01/01/2028 to 12/31/2028) ²	260,000.00	-	780,000.00	-
Target total remuneration	804,107.90	304,107.90	1,564,107.90	808,492.88

1 The fringe benefits include allowances for voluntary pension insurance, the noncash benefit of a company car that can also be used privately or a car allowance, health insurance contributions and a job bike allowance.

2 The amount corresponds to the maximum achievable payout amount, which is limited to 300% of the target amount. The amount of the LTI payout is calculated from the final number of performance shares, which depends on the overall target achievement level (0 to 200%) at the end of the performance period, multiplied by the sum of the average closing price (arithmetic mean) of the SUSS MicroTec SE share in XETRA trading on Deutsche Börse AG on the last 60 trading days before the end of the performance period and the cumulative dividend paid out during the performance period (the "dividend equivalent").

Remuneration granted and owed to Management Board members in the 2025 financial year:

In the interests of transparency and reporting that is as close to the period as possible, remuneration is reported in accordance with a performance-based interpretation. Accordingly, the short-term variable remuneration (STI) for the 2025 financial year, for example, is regarded as remuneration granted or owed, although it is not due for payment until the 2026 financial year. The background to this is that the underlying service was fully rendered by the end of the 2025 financial year.

In the 2025 financial year, the current and former members of the Management Board were remunerated as shown in the following tables.

Remuneration granted and owed to current members of the Management Board

Burkhardt Frick, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Start date: September 11, 2023

Remuneration granted and owed in €	2025	in %	2024	in %
Basic remuneration	300,000.00	38.70%	300,000.00	37.43%
Fringe benefits (fixed)	21,885.60	2.82%	20,442.48	2.55%
Total	321,885.60	41.52%	320,442.48	39.98%
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	200,200.00	25.82%	481,000.00	60.02%
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2023 (performance period 01/01/2023 to 12/31/2025 and vesting period 01/01/2026 to 12/31/2026)	253,150.68	32.65%	-	-
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2024 (performance period 01/01/2024 to 12/31/2026 and vesting period 01/01/2027 to 12/31/2027) ¹	-	-	-	-
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2025 (performance period 01/01/2025 to 12/31/2027 and vesting period 01/01/2028 to 12/31/2028) ¹	-	-	-	-
Total remuneration	775,236.28	100.0%	801,442.48	100.0%

¹ The LTI tranche 2024–2026 and the LTI tranche 2025–2027 have not yet been earned and granted, as the performance period has not yet ended.

Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Start date: July 1, 2023

Remuneration granted and owed in €	2025	in %	2024	in %
Basic remuneration	275,000.00	30.11%	275,000.00	35.20%
Fringe benefits (fixed)	23,651.64	2.59%	22,208.52	2.84%
Retention bonus ¹	40,000.00	4.38%	40,000.00	5.12%
Total	338,651.64	37.07%	337,208.52	43.16%
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	184,800.00	20.23%	444,000.00	56.84%
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2023 (performance period 01/01/2023 to 12/31/2025 and vesting period 01/01/2026 to 12/31/2026)	390,000.00	42.70%	-	-
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2024 (performance period 01/01/2024 to 12/31/2026 and vesting period 01/01/2027 to 12/31/2027) ²	-	-	-	-
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2025 (performance period 01/01/2025 to 12/31/2027 and vesting period 01/01/2028 to 12/31/2028) ²	-	-	-	-
Total remuneration	913,451.64	100.0%	781,208.52	100.0%

1 Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer receives a retention bonus of € 40,000 at the end of each year of service (i.e., annual reporting date) during the three-year employment period, which is paid out with the next salary statement, provided that she continues to be appointed and employed as a member of the Management Board on the respective annual reporting date.

2 The LTI tranche 2024–2026 and the LTI tranche 2025–2027 have not yet been earned and granted, as the performance period has not yet ended.

Dr. Thomas Rohe, Chief Operations Officer (COO), Start date: May 1, 2021

Remuneration granted and owed in €	2025	in %	2024	in %
Basic remuneration	275,000.00	21.67%	275,000.00	23.76%
Fringe benefits (fixed)	29,107.90	2.29%	33,492.88	2.89%
Total	304,107.90	23.97%	308,492.88	26.65%
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	184,800.00	14.56%	444,000.00	38.36%
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): 2022 tranche (performance period 01/01/2022 to 12/31/2024 and vesting period 01/01/2025 to 12/31/2025)	-	-	405,000.00	34.99%
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2023 (performance period 01/01/2023 to 12/31/2025 and vesting period 01/01/2026 to 12/31/2026)	780,000.00	61.47%	-	-
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2024 (performance period 01/01/2024 to 12/31/2026 and vesting period 01/01/2027 to 12/31/2027) ¹	-	-	-	-
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): 2025 tranche (performance period 01/01/2025 to 12/31/2027 and vesting period 01/01/2028 to 12/31/2028) ¹	-	-	-	-
Total remuneration	1,268,907.90	100.00%	1,157,492.88	100.00%

¹ The LTI tranche 2024–2026 and the LTI tranche 2025–2027 have not yet been earned and granted, as the respective performance period has not yet been completed

Remuneration granted and owed to former members of the Management Board

Oliver Albrecht, former Chief Financial Officer CFO, Departure date: April 30, 2023

Remuneration granted and owed in €	2025	in %	2024	in %
Basic remuneration	-	-	-	-
Fringe benefits (fixed)	-	-	-	-
Total	-	-	-	-
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	-	-	-	-
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2022 (performance period 01/01/2022 to 12/31/2024 and vesting period 01/01/2025 to 12/31/2025)	-	-	307,500.00	100.00%
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI): Tranche 2023 (performance period 01/01/2023 to 12/31/2025 and vesting period 01/01/2026 to 12/31/2026)	102,500.00	100.00%	-	-
Total remuneration	102,500.00	100.00%	307,500.00	100.00%

Pensions

There are no pension obligations for current members or former members of the Management Board.

Remuneration of the Supervisory Board members

The remuneration of the Supervisory Board members is set out in greater detail in Section 20 of the Statute of the Company. The Supervisory Board members receive a fixed annual remuneration of € 45,000.00. The Chair of the Supervisory Board receives 2.4 times and the Deputy Chair 1.5 times the (fixed) remuneration granted in accordance with Article 20 (1)(1) of the Statute. In addition, each member of the Audit Committee receives an annual fixed remuneration of € 15,000.00 and the Chair of the Audit Committee receives 2.67 times this amount. Each member of the Personnel Committee or the Personnel and Nomination Committee receives an annual fixed remuneration of € 10,000.00, and each member of other committees formed by the Supervisory Board receives an annual fixed remuneration of € 10,000.00 per committee, whereby the Chairs of these committees each receive 2.0 times the aforementioned amounts. If a Supervisory Board member belongs to two committees at the same time, only the highest-paid committee membership is remunerated in addition to the fixed annual remuneration pursuant to Section 20 (1)(1) of the Statute. If a Supervisory Board member belongs to more than two committees at the same time, only the committee membership in the two highest-paid committees is paid in addition to the fixed annual remuneration pursuant to Section 20 (1)(1) of the Statute.

In addition, each Supervisory Board member receives an attendance fee of € 1,000.00 for attending meetings of the Supervisory Board and meetings of a committee of which they are a member, whether held in person, by telephone or video conference, or via a similar means of telecommunication. Multiple meetings (regardless of whether they are meetings for the Supervisory Board or committees) held on the same day are not remunerated more than once.

In the 2025 (and 2024) financial year, the current members of the Supervisory Board were remunerated as follows:

in €	Fixed remuneration 2025	Fixed remuneration 2024	Supervisory Board attendance fees 2025	Supervisory Board attendance fees 2024	Committee remuneration 2025	Committee remuneration 2024	Committee attendance fees 2025	Committee attendance fees 2024	Total remuneration 2025	Total remuneration 2024
Supervisory Board										
Dr. David Dean (Chair of the Supervisory Board)	108,000.00	90,000.00	18,000.00	9,000.00	20,000.00	20,000.00	18,000.00	8,000.00	164,000.00	127,000.00
Dr. Myriam Jahn (Deputy Chair of the Supervisory Board)	67,500.00	67,500.00	17,000.00	9,000.00	20,000.00	20,000.00	15,000.00	6,000.00	119,500.00	102,500.00
Dr. Bernd Schulte	45,000.00	45,000.00	18,000.00	9,000.00	15,000.00	15,000.00	6,000.00	5,000.00	84,000.00	74,000.00
Jan Smits	45,000.00	45,000.00	18,000.00	8,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00	21,000.00	9,000.00	109,000.00	87,000.00
Prof. Dr. Mirja Steinkamp	45,000.00	45,000.00	18,000.00	8,000.00	40,050.00	30,000.00	9,000.00	7,000.00	112,050.00	90,000.00

No remuneration was granted or owed to former members of the Supervisory Board in the 2025 financial year.

In the 2025 financial year, neither the members of the Supervisory Board nor persons or companies related to them received any remuneration or benefits for services provided personally, in particular consulting and agency services.

Comparative presentation of remuneration and earnings development

The following comparative presentation shows the annual change in remuneration granted and owed to current and former members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board, the Company's earnings development, and employee remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis. The Company's earnings development is not solely based on the respective

consolidated net income or loss (HGB), but additionally, on a voluntary basis, the consolidated net income (IFRS) is also considered, as this metric serves as a performance criterion for the variable remuneration of the Management Board members. The average remuneration of employees is based on the wages and salaries and the number of employees of all German Group companies on a full-time equivalent (FTE) basis in the respective financial year.

Comparative presentation of remuneration and earnings development

in € thousand	2025	Change compared to previous year	2024	Change vs. PY	2023	Change compared to previous year	2022	Change compared to previous year	2021
Remuneration of the Management Board									
Burkhardt Frick (start date 9/11/2023)	775	-3.2%	801	155.1%	314				
Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer (start date 07/01/2023)	913	16.9%	781	142.5%	322				
Dr. Thomas Rohe (start date 05/01/2021)	1,269	9.6%	1,157	106.6%	560	48.1%	378	29.9%	291
Dr. Bernd Schulte (start date 10/17/2022, departure date 09/10/2023 – due to temporary appointment to the Management Board)					260	229.1%	79		
Oliver Albrecht (start date 11/18/2019, departure date 4/30/2023)	103	-66.6%	308	38.5%	222	-46.8%	417	2.0%	409
Dr. Götz M. Bendele (start date 05/01/2021, departure date 10/16/2022)			577	153.2%	228	-81.4%	1,227	168.5%	457
Supervisory Board remuneration									
Dr. David Dean (since 05/20/2020)	164	29.1%	127	-2.3%	130	-5.1%	137	23.4%	111
Dr. Myriam Jahn (since 05/31/2017)	120	16.5%	103	-6.0%	109	6.9%	102	17.2%	87
Dr. Bernd Schulte (since 11/06/2020, suspended 10/17/2022 to 9/10/2023 due to secondment to Management Board)	84	13.5%	74	236.4%	22	-64.5%	62	-15.1%	73
Jan Smits (since 05/20/2020)	109	25.3%	87	-7.4%	94	16.0%	81	5.2%	77
Prof. Dr. Mirja Steinkamp (since 03/04/2022)	112	24.5%	90	-4.3%	94	25.3%	75		
Earnings development									
Net income for the financial year for SUSS MicroTec SE	26,325	-60.8%	67,190	1,846.4%	3,452	-71.7%	12,198	-69.2%	39,591
Consolidated net income	46,107	-58.1%	109,974	2,241.4%	4,697	-80.8%	24,524	53.1%	16,015
Average employee remuneration German SUSS companies	80.66	-3.9%	83.95 ¹	10.9%	75.7	5.1%	72.0	-0.6%	72.4

¹ The figure for 2024 includes special payments (inflation adjustments) and increased performance-based compensation components, as well as one-time bonuses for all employees due to the positive business performance.

Other

SUSS has taken out a directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) for members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board. The premiums for this are paid by the Company. In accordance with the requirements of stock corporation law, a deductible of 10% of the loss up to the amount of one and a half times the annual fixed remuneration of the respective Management Board member is provided for the members of the Management Board. Due to the current version of the German Corporate Governance Code, there is no longer a deductible for members of the Supervisory Board. Moreover, the members of the Management Board are included in a group accident insurance policy. The premiums for this are also paid by the Company.

Outlook for the 2026 financial year from a remuneration perspective

In the 2025 financial year, the Company's Supervisory Board, with the preparation and advice of its Personnel and Nomination Committee, further developed the current remuneration system in individual areas (2026 Remuneration System) for the members of the Management Board, which was approved by the Annual General Meeting on May 31, 2022, with a majority of 98.35% of the votes cast, and adopted it at its meetings on December 7, 2025 and March 23, 2026.

Taking into account SUSS's corporate strategy, current market practice and feedback from institutional investors and proxy advisors, the new 2026 Remuneration System focuses on linking Management Board remuneration even more closely to SUSS's share price performance in order to further strengthen the convergence of interests between the Management Board and shareholders. In addition, the sustainability targets in the variable remuneration were further sharpened in line with the overall corporate strategy.

The adjustments to the remuneration system mainly relate to the following areas:

- The sustainability targets derived from the overall corporate strategy and the materiality analysis in both the STI and the LTI are being further sharpened. The sustainability targets in the STI now focus on the social area (e.g., employee satisfaction and development) and in the LTI on the environmental area (e.g., reduction of CO₂ emissions in Scope 1, 2, and 3). As good corporate governance is a mandatory expectation, governance criteria are no longer included as a category in the sustainability targets in the STI and LTI.
- As part of the nonfinancial targets and in line with the strategic direction, the short-term variable remuneration (short-term incentive, STI) places a strong focus on the area of innovation and market position. The weighting of the innovation and market position target is increased from 15% to 20%, while the weighting of the now more stringent sustainability target is reduced from 15% to 10%.

- For the long-term variable remuneration (long-term incentive, LTI), a stronger focus is placed on sales growth as part of the criteria for the Company's financial performance. The weighting of the sales growth target will therefore be increased from 25% to 30%. In return for the higher weighting of sales growth, the weighting of the sustainability target in the LTI will be reduced slightly from 25% to 20%.
- In addition, the relative TSR is to be weighted higher at 30% instead of the previous 25% in order to achieve an even stronger capital market orientation. In order to accurately compare the TSR performance of SUSS with strategically relevant competitors in the future, an appropriately predefined peer group of around 15 to 20 listed comparable companies will be used instead of using the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index and the DAXsector Technology Index with their companies as peer groups, as was previously the case. In return, the weighting of the return on capital employed (ROCE) target will be reduced from 25% to 20%.
- Sign-on bonuses are excluded; they can no longer be granted to members of the Management Board. New members of the Management Board can only be paid compensation for forfeited variable remuneration benefits from the previous employment relationship, the net amount of which must then be invested in shares of the Company in accordance with the Share Ownership Guidelines. The sole purpose of the

compensation payment is to compensate for the loss of variable remuneration entitlements as a result of the change. This can make it easier, or even make it possible in the first place, to attract highly qualified talent who would otherwise have to accept considerable financial disadvantages if they were to give up their current position with their existing employer. The obligation to invest the net settlement amount in shares of the Company that are subject to the Share Ownership Guidelines also means that the interests of the Management Board member are aligned even more closely with the interests of the shareholders.

- As part of the Share Ownership Guidelines with their share purchase and holding obligations for the members of the Management Board, an increased personal investment target is set for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in the event of their reappointment. For the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the personal investment amount increases from 100% to 150% of the annual gross basic remuneration upon their first reappointment.

The 2026 Remuneration System is therefore characterized overall by a stronger focus on the overall corporate strategy and a greater capital market orientation.

Garching, March 27, 2026

Signed for the Management
Board of SUSS MicroTec SE

Burkhardt Frick
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)

Dr. Cornelia Ballwießer
Chief Financial Officer (CFO)

Dr. Thomas Rohe
Chief Operations Officer
(COO)

Signed for the Supervisory
Board of SUSS MicroTec SE

Dr. David Dean
Chair of the Supervisory Board
of SUSS MicroTec SE

Audit Certificate of the Independent Auditor

Report of the independent auditor on the formal audit of the remuneration report pursuant to §162 Abs.3 AktG

To SUSS MicroTec SE, Garching bei München

Opinion

We have formally audited the remuneration report of the SUSS MicroTec SE, Garching bei München, for the financial year from January 1, to December 31, 2025 to determine whether the disclosures pursuant to § [Article] 162 Abs. [paragraphs] 1 and 2 AktG [Aktiengesetz: German Stock Corporation Act] have been made in the remuneration report. In accordance with § 162 Abs. 3 AktG, we have not audited the content of the remuneration report.

In our opinion, the information required by § 162 Abs. 1 and 2 AktG has been disclosed in all material respects in the accompanying remuneration report. Our opinion does not cover the content of the remuneration report.

Basis for the opinion

We conducted our formal audit of the remuneration report in accordance with § 162 Abs. 3 AktG and IDW [Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer: Institute of Public Auditors in Germany] Auditing Standard: The formal audit of the remuneration report in accordance with § 162 Abs. 3 AktG (IDW AuS 870 (09.2023)). Our responsibility under that provision and that standard is further described in the "Auditor's Responsibilities" section of our auditor's report. As an audit firm, we have complied with the requirements of the IDW Quality Management Standard: Requirements to quality management for audit firms [IDW Qualitätsmanagementstandard - IDW QMS 1 (09.2022)]. We have complied with the professional duties pursuant to the Professional Code for German Public Auditors and German Chartered Auditors [Berufssatzung für Wirtschaftsprüfer und vereidigte Buchprüfer - BS WP/vBP], including the requirements for independence.

Responsibility of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board

The management board and the supervisory board are responsible for the preparation of the remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that complies with the requirements of § 162 AktG. They are also responsible for such internal control as they determine is necessary to enable the preparation of a remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud (i.e., fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets) or error.

Auditor's Responsibilities

Our objective is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the information required by § 162 Abs. 1 and 2 AktG has been disclosed in all material respects in the remuneration report and to express an opinion thereon in an auditor's report.

We planned and performed our audit to determine, through comparison of the disclosures made in the remuneration report with the disclosures required by § 162 Abs. 1 and 2 AktG, the formal completeness of the remuneration report. In accordance with § 162 Abs 3 AktG, we have not audited the accuracy of the disclosures, the completeness of the content of the individual disclosures, or the appropriate presentation of the remuneration report.

Munich, March 27, 2026

PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft

Sebastian Stroner

Wirtschaftsprüfer
(German Public Auditor)

ppa. Ralph Jakobi

Wirtschaftsprüfer
(German Public Auditor)

Growing Innovation



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